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James Allan*

An Unashamed Majoritarian

The author a Canadian teaching in Australia, challenges what he regards as the
prevailing Canadian orthodoxy, one that he thinks gives the unelected judiciary
too much power. He challenges the perception that rights, however understood
and though fully supported, necessitate the construction of anti-majoritarian
protections such as the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Knowing that
the Charter is here to stay he concludes by urging judges to adopt methods of
interpretation that build in a much greater degree of deference to the legislature.
L'auteur,un Canadien qui enseigne en Australie, pose un regard interrogateur
sur ce qu'll considere comme le courant dominant au Canada qui, selon lui,
donne trop de pouvoir aux magistrats non elus. II s'oppose 6 la perception que
les drolts, peu importe Ia fagon dont ils sont compris et m~me s'ils jouissent d'un
appul inconditionnel,ont besoin de protections contraires 6 Ia majoriti comme,
par exemple, la Charte canadienne des droits et libertes. Sachant que la Charte
est 16 pour rester, I'auteurconclut en pressant les juges d'adopter des methodes
d'Interpretationqui attirent un degre beaucoup plus grand de respect pour les
lois.

Garrick Professor of Law, University of Queensland, Australia and from August-December,
2004, the Bertha Wilson Visiting Professor of Human Rights, Dalhousie Law School. The author is
a native-born Canadian who is a graduate of a Canadian law school. Earlier versions of this paper
were presented at a Dalhousie Law School staff seminar and at a University of Western Ontario law
School invited lecture. The author wishes to thank all participants at both events for their comments,
criticisms and questions.
*
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I am an unashamed majoritarian. I think that the least bad procedure for
reolx in(, disagreements N ithin a socict\ like Canada's is to let the numbers count Mlorc \otes should beat fc\\er Notes \\hen it comes to difficult,
contentious social policy decisions, exen those about rights.
Of course no one these dax, proftecs to be against democracy. So
proclaiming that one is a democrat tells the reader next to nothing. In
particular, it !i\es no information on where one stands as regards the
desirability of strongjudicial rex iex\ under the Char-tcr ol Rights.' Democracy is an "essentially contested concept," one broad enough to encompass hoth the position of those \\ ho support the current Canadian status
quo and the position of those who think it gives the unelected judiciary too
much pox\ cr. So an\ debate about "democratic legitimacy" is likely to end
in a debate about the meaning of the \\ord "democracy". The trouble with
that, with arguing about the meaning of the word "democracy", to repeat
m\ elf i's that democracy is a concept broad and indeterminate enough to
be capable of being defined in a \ariet\ of plausible \\avs. Accordingly,
not much is to be gained heading down that road, in my \ie\v,3 howexer
much there max be clear tactical and rhetorical advantages for both sides
in positioning oneself on the side of democracx. xxith all the strong
emotixe connotations conveyed by that \xord.
On the other hand, there are many, many people toda\ in Canada and
throughout the xestern world - in the lax\ schools. the press, the intelligentsia, and ex en the government
\ho assuredl\ are not supporters of
xmajoritarianism. For them, letting the numbers count comes x\ ith too big a

S
2.
So,

(CanadianCharl'r ,l[ Rights and Freedoms. I 1X2, c. 1 1. [Chartcr].
See 'A. H Gallic, "' .inally
i
Contestcd ( on.ept," ( 1965) 50 ProCc'tlIng.\ o/ the ,Ir stttclico
t i at 57.

3.
On the que,ticn
the I. \ccutie and the
way"' (2001 ) 24 Dal.
Parotv (Peterbor.ugh,

of what is or is not dcmocraiic. ho'ioc\ or. cf. \%',i ne \MaeKay, "The Legislature,
( ourt,: The Delicatc Balance of Power or \\ ho is Running this Country AnyL. 1.37 and F.L \orton and R. Knopff, The Charter Revolution and the Court
On.: Broadviek. Pres. 2000)
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price tag. it is too likely to lead to the sacrili,.c of ndi\ idual rights N hilc
making more likel\ still the dan-ers oflhe N
vralm\ of the majority. Maor
it\ rule needs, the\ sa\ (or think), to be tempered b\ placing in the hands
of thel judiciary the po\ ci to ensure that legislation (passed on the basis of
representati\ c imaoritarianisll) can be struck down \\ hen it is inconsistent
\%ith certain enumerated ndi\ idual rights and when that inconsistency is
held not to be reasonable in a free and democratic societv such as ('anada.
I \\ ill call this anti-mlatoritarian x iexx the "'orthodox position" in Canada
today or the "status quo". I do not think that it is Scriousl\ debatable that
this is the stalu, quo \ le\. that the preponderance otlelite opinion in Canada
toda\ opposes full-blooded maioritarianisin and \Nholc-heartedly supports
the role that (' anada's judges ha\ c been gix en, or hae ca rved out for themselxes. under the Chwh'wr. BLit I' I am right oi- wrong on that empirical
question. it does not affect the merits of whether majoritarianism oughl to
be embriaced.
\ccordingl\. the rest of this paper \NIll attempt to co ince the reader
that it should be, that it is undesirable to hand ox er to unelected judges the
social polic> -making po\ver implicit in being the Final arbiters of \\hat
content. scope and relatix e\\eight rights are to hawe. \\e need to balance
the potential dangers of majorit\ rule and the spectre of a tyranny of the
majority against the potential dangcr, of1minorat\ rule and the spectre of a
tyranny of the uInelected f'ex (\\hich of'coui,e. historicall, is the far greater
danger).
Let us start that attempt to make the case for maJoritarianism xxith an
exarnination of rights. One cannot assess the desitabililt of a bill of rights
\Nithout first being clear about rights themsel cs.

I. Rights
Today. rights are the dominant current\ of political and moral philosophy.
Following the Second \\ornd \ar there has been an immense increase in
rights talk' both in the sheer \ oluime of that talk and in the number of
supposed rights being claimed. \ol too long ago rights x\ere rather
modestly seen as providing "a IcLgitimiiation of... claims against tyrannical or exploiting regimes."' These daxs there is a strong tendency to

4
Scc Tom Campbell. Th I k,u/ Thc, -I o/ lhi/au Pmsiit is' m (Aldcr,,hoI Brookflcld, Vi
Dartmouth. 9 6) at 161 -1l ,'.
SA. ltenn. 'Human Rights
l i \khom and iFor \\harT" in Kanicnka and Tai. ed.. luma
Righl. (London: Edmond Arnold, 1978) 61.
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adxance \irtually aill moral claims in the lanuLia-gC ofrights.
Yct \\hat are rights'
ertainly one can find plenty written about who
lax clai in rights, their c\tcnl, ther o\ er-ridin char ctcr, and c\cn the
relation ofi ihlts h) notiol s ol'cquailit\ and lihcri\. Yet none of that need
deal c\plicitllx With the foundational Issue of \\hat. precisely. rights are.
S-oimc. wx
hen pressed, xwiII say no more than that rights are entitlements or
guaralllCs or protections. Others x iii be more fortlhconing: Rights are
protections agiustill, intericincec onferred h\ rule', or norms. Or, rights
are part of the liberal emphasis ol the indi\ idual, affording protections
and entitlements to him or her. ()r again, rights are associated wx'ith the
prolection and claims of'i ndi\ iduals (or maye
heOtLpS too), bC they against
the state, aainst persons oi bodies aclt ln in a public Function, or just agailrist
other Indiv'iduals.
One max xcii hcai-i- his elucidated inal\ ticall\ On this account, the
cvistencc of a right prC-SUlppossN the CeiStiicC of a rule. \ right ("others
must") is the conx crsc of a dulty ("I mLust") and both are linked to somc
rule: in other words, ai igiht aN
! rule." Thus to the query. "xx here do rights
cone fr'oni.' the anal\ iical ins\\ e-i is sIiliilt
for ard - from a rule which
imposes obl iio
o oil ei-, he the\ indg\
rdalS,
oupls, institions or
,,o\ ermlnent. In the -al irealm. theirefore. one finds legal right, by finding /C"/ rules. These Rules can come in statLutor\ form le,, rules about
makingz \ alid wrills) or tic e\tracled From a line of cases (.,. rules about
ic'- i cencct or be seen to ha\ cu ox1 fr omLcLiStOmary practices (e . rules
go\ erniig the need 1'or consideration in making an oral contract) or c\ en
sC out broiadl\ and te-il l\ in i bill of rights for the judiciary to make
illore ccrtain and spcic in the \ al-iOus cascs that arise ( c.-. \x hether ad\ertmsing is to count is protected free speechl.

The problem still remains. ho\\e\cr. \one of these an,,\ cis about
rights gets at the floundational issue ol 'hat. plCciscl\, rights are. E\cii if
rights are anal\ ticull. equix ilemt to rules, and cxen ii"\ e can all scc \\ hee
legl/ IuleC Coie fro111, thait is no help at the lexcl of first principles and
pollitl moralities. From ixhei does the nlon-legal rule arise that ix es
Iil'c to i claimed ,in-lgalright to free speech in China. sa\, or to housing
in Canada' On the plane of political moralit\, of offerin, an account or
x ision about the place of human beings in socct\ or lax be c\ en in the
\\hole Ofe\listenCe, \\e still hakc no anis\\C]',. I\cin such an1adherent of
right, as Ronald l)x\ork icc-nI/cs
tiils difficulty: "'But what arc rights

6
Thi \%a, mmu ,l\ Ir.l cmphi /cd h\\\ N
I C SCC xx
N ltohl'ld. I" idaumoiluIl L 'ul
(<, cplum
1%.Iil/ ii .mI l R,u'
'l ,
\ crshot: x ilc..
201 ).
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and goals and what is the difference? It is hard to supply any definition
that does not beg the question."D\\orkin can be taken to mean that attempts to provide a theory of
rights that does not fall back on some sort ofconsequentialist or utilitarian
thinking are b\ no means cas\ to defend. Jeremy Waldron is more explicit
still: "Non-utilitarian theories [of rights] tend to be technically less sophisticated: often the' contain little more than a bare assertion that certain
rights are intuiti\ elv e\ ident or are at any rate to be taken as first principles." ,
I happen to agree \ ith this. In fact, I have written elsewhere" that
theories of rihts at the level of first principles fall into two broad camps:
\%hat I ha\ e dubbed "w eak rights theories" and "'strong rights theories".
The former offers a defence of rights, a political morality, that is "xweak"
because rights are not seen as good-in-themsel\ cs: rather rights are concei\ ed of as instrumentally good because of the further benefits they tend
to bring with them. \\eak rights adherents \\ant to achiexe some state of
affairs, perhaps more liberty or more equality or more justice, and they
judge it necessary to do this bN establishing rights (b'\ enunciating rules),
more specifically b\ creating legal right,, For them, rights art' \ alued. But
that value comes fi-om the good consequences that experience tells us tend
to flowx fi'om establishing particular rights, sa, a right related to free speech
or to freedom of assembl\ or to freedom of religion.
Weak rights adherents can hold any number of deeper philosophical
positions. '" Most obviousl, tles can be utilitarians \ 1ho make human happiness or welfare the ultimate good and see the establishment of certain
rights (and hence rules) as a means to increase oxerall human happiness.
For our purposes, ho\xex er. the point is simply that \\ ith weak rights theories. rights are valued, but in an instrumental way only. To further some
goal or value, it is thought to be good to establish certain legal rights.
Of course having made the calculation that the establishment of some
particular set of legal rights is a good idea. it in no way follo'ss that

7
Ronald I),%orkm, Taking Rtghtl\ i riou.4Ii, (London I)uck',orth. I977) at 90(
."; Jeremy Waldron. "Introduction" in (J. Waldron. cd.) Theorics ol Right' (()ford ()LRP 9)4)
at 19
9.
Sec my "B1il of Rights and Judicial Po\%er ,A Liberal', Quandar'" ( 19961 16 0xlord .I. Legal
Stud- 337 ["Quandary"] and my Si mli'tllodi h
tiiiliill
tnd
t\ ldershot: \-lgaii. 21)2) ["s mpalh '].
I repeat here what I said there about weak or consequentiali~i rights theories and strong or nonconsequentialist rights theories \nd for more on hov" much of the rights debate lcaes aside the
fundamental issue ofwhy ,, cshould think non-legal rights actually exists, see my "A Defence of the
Status Quo" in Campbell, Golds,,iorthy and Stone. ed . Prac ling hinian Ri hl." nlmriimeni-i ul
Institutions (Osford: OUR 2003) 175.
1I
For more elucidation on this. see "Quandary" article. i/ul at 340-342.
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turning these rights into entrenched constitutional right', ", also a good
idea. That is a separate calculation. Sorne weak rights adherents ill be in
fa\ our, some will be opposed. But because, for them, right, are lot goodsin-themselcs, the calculation will depend on something elsC. iiost probably ol whether a constitutionalized bill of rights is thought to deliver
good consequences or not.
The other way broadly to defend riglts take, a more \igorous, noninstrumental stance as regards rights. Strong rights theories conceive of
rights as goods-in-themselves. The idea here is that each human being
simply has basic rights. Regardlc,,s of other aims, goals, duties, or even of
fairlv horrendou, long-term consequences to the cumulati\c wvelfare of
societ\. certain basic entitlements or protections just are mandated. On
this strong rights \ ic\\ of the world, right, are not mediately justified; they
arc good-in-themscl\c,. corne what ma\. Jcrem. \\'aldron writes "To belie\e in righlts is to belie\c that certain key interests ofindi\ iduals, in liberty and xkell-being. desenre special protection. and that they should not
be sacrificed for the sake of greater efficiency or prosperity or for any
agregate of lesscr interests Under the heading of the public good."''
To be clear. then. strong rights theories are political moralities which
refuse to look behind the claim to rights. [le basic currency of these
moralities is rights themsel\ e,,: they are the starting point. Adherents wvill
not, or louicallv cannot, ainswcr the question "'\\hy are certain rights good
or desirable'." in terms ofsone other end as to do so \\ould be to collapse
one's political moralit\ into a weak right, theory.
In my opinion, the rebirth of rights thinking since the end of the
Second \\orld \Var and the mas,,,i\e e\tent to %%hich \ irtually all moral
claims arc advanced in the language of fundamental human rights rest
largely on a natural law foundation. That i,, to claim that most
not all,
but most
rights adherents today hold. e\plicitl\ or implicitly, strong
rights views. They may be Dworkinians, Ra\ lsian,,. Kantians. born-again
natural law believers and more.'" but the, share the conception of humans
as autonomous, self-governing beings, entitled to re',pect and responsibility, and bearers of some set of rights rcgardhcv

tJitt'i

i'frtc'mI ('fclpl
l s.

To repeat, I think that strong rights theories, as an empirical matter, are
more \\ idely held than weak rights theories. At the same tine, I also agree
with Waldron that strong rights theories, when pushed to their core,

II

Jeremy Waldron. "A Rights-Based Critique of Constitutional Right,' (199i3

13 "'\lurd j

L egal Stud 18 at 30.

12.
or rnore on tihe many sor,, of thcories thai start hNmaking rights fundamental. adii
themseI',e. we, "Quandary' xpra note 9 at 342-344.
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"contain little more than a bare assertion that certain rights are intuitively
eident or are at any rate to be taken as first principles."' 3 In fact I would
go further and sav that I find all the strong rights theories that I have read
to be unconvincing and implausible. 4 I think \xeak rights theories are far
more convincing, though this is a minority \ iewA.
Yet whate\ er one's \ie\\ of the relati\ c attractions of strong rights and
\Ncak rights theories, notice that the strong rights adherent who sees
certain rights as inherently good, and who wN
ill presumably want his or her
societ\ to make those rights into legal rights, need not be in favour of
constitutionalizing those rights as part of an entrenched bill of rights. For
the strong rights adherent, just as with the weak rights adherent, it is an
open question \ hether adopting or retaining a bill of rights is a good idea.
The difference is this: strong rights adherents come to the question of
the desirability or other\x ise of strong judicial re\riev\ with a view of their
fellow humans as autonomous. self-go\ erning bearers of inherent rights.
One such right looks to be the right to participate in social decision-making. indeed to have an equal sa\ in all important issues, e\ en issues related
to the scope. content and relative weight of rights. Gix en the vie\ s strong
rights adherents bring to the table, on what grounds can they be in favour
ofdiscnfranchizing the o\ erwhelming majority of the population (in fax our
ofa tc\\ select judges) on major social policy or on basic rights questions?
It is hard to see lio\\ it can be on the basis of a distrust of their fellow
citizens. givXen the viev s they have for supporting rights in the first place.
But then what does an entrenched bill of rights do if not disenfranchize the
non-judge on all sorts of issues'.) The right to participate, the right of rights,
gets to some extent shunted aside.":
\Weak rights adherents, on the other hand, have no such difficulties.
The\ will just opt for the set-up which delivers the best consequences,
\kith or without a bill of rights. They have always made rights subject to
costs and benefits. It is at least odd, though, even ironic, for strong rights
'Subscribers no\x to put aside their core level non-consequentialism and
choose between a bill of rights regime or a non-bill of rights regime on the
basis of which is thought to deliver better outcomes. Why, precisely, do
strong rights believers subordinate the right to participate to a
consequentialist calculation of likely outcomes'?

13

Supra note 11.

14. See my "Sympathy", supra note 9, for this argument in length.
I5, And that, in far too brief a form, is the general idea of Jeremy Waldron's attack on bills of
rihts. These instruments do not take seriously, the right to participate. See, e.g. Jeremy Waldron
Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press. I Q99) ["Law-].
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I he case lbr maloritarianism can now turn to consider what actually
happens under a bill of rights. What is it that judges end up deciding'? This
will matter. Yet perhaps one last point about rights should be made, and
made unequi\ocally. Waldron writes "No one now believes that the truth
about rights is self-ex ident or that, ift\ o people disagree about rights, one
of them at lcast must be either corrupt or morally blind.""
If rights \wcre sclf-e ident, if it wkcre obvious to all right thinking
beings ho\. say, the right to free speech should affect campaign finance
rules or hate speech lawvs or defamation pro\ isions, so that all was consensus and aureement, then "who decide,'."' would be an unimportant matter.
But that sort of agreement simply does not exist. It is true that the antimajoritarian case would be stronger if it did, if there was widespread
consensus about the scope, range and \eighting of rights. But as I shall
argue belo\, dow n in the quagmire of using amorphous rights guarantees
to draw difficult social policy lines, it is clear to all that disagreement and
disscnsus \ irtually alw\avs exist.
This empirical tact of disagreement might yet be o\ ercome if you could
casil\ characteri/e \,out opponents as unreasonable, morally blind or
w ieked. That sort of characterization may frequently enough be felt, but in
m\x \iew it is unwarranted. The fact is that smart, reasonable, e\ en nice
people disagree about how rights should plaN out. Part of living in a
democracy is that you win some and you lose some - your views do not
automatically prevail simply because you think them the morally best views.
Your opponents think that too. And of course disagreement about rights is
not restricted to xoters. The unelected judges themselves regularly
disagree, sometimes by 5-4 margins. And when it comes to these moral,
xaluc-based disaureements about rights, there is simplN no w\aN to resolxe
them that is remotely analogous to resolx ing disputes about what is happening in the external causal world, the world of fact and science where
there is an imposed, external, mind-independent realit, howe\er much it
may be filtered and interpreted b\ humans. (E\en the ardent
deconstructionist. postmodernist, anti-foundationalist zealot will not jump
from the sixth storx windo\ - he knows in his heart that grax itv is not a
.social construct, created by the dominant position of males over females
or capitalists o\ er proletariat.)
So "right anw,\crs" about rights must be understood quite differently

16
\ aldr,n, uipra.
note II at 2-) Grant fluscroft has pointed out to me that in Lay'.
ibid., \\Valdon
has chanecd this to -\o onc in the trade nov bhelixes .". I am unsure \\hat to make of this. \\hat
follos is part ,Ithe gencral WV ldronian critique.
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from right ansNcrs in the world of medicine, aviation or engineering. This
is true \\ hether one is a strong rights adherent or a weak rights adherent. In
fact, c\ en if rights were transcendent, mind-independent moral entities.
and even if there were a moral truth to how\ they should play out - both
possibilities I think implausible - the fact remains that we humans would
haxe no \\av to know \\hat that mind-independent moral truth was. We
would hav e our belief's about them, but then so would our opponents. Surely
it is unlikel\. in that case. that any one person or group of people would
ha\ e a pipeline to this sort of godly \\ isdom that all who disagree lack.
This last point about rights must always be remembered. People
disagree about how rights should app/v down in the quagmire of detail.
The majoritarian says that that disagreement should be resolved by voting,
by letting the numbers count. Proponents of strong judicial review want
that disagreement resolved b\ unelected judges. When those judges
disagree amongst themselx es. ironically, they get to vote. Everyone else is
disenfranchized.

II. fVhat Happens Under a Bill of Right\.'
The rights set out in a bill of rights - the right to freedom of expression or
of religion or of association or movement, to equality or to be secure against
unreasonable search and seizure - enunciate \ery general standards about
the place of the individual in society. That is to say, bills of rights offer an
emotionally attracti\ e statement of entitlements and protections in vague,
amorphous, xery broad terms. Nearly all of us can support rights Vhile
they remain up in the Olympian heights
viscerally appealing but indeterminate. That is \yhv such instruments are sold to the public up there.
\Who. after all, would say she is against free speech?
However, the effects of bills of rights are not felt up in these Olympian
heights. They are felt way down in the quagmire of detail of where to draw
the line when it comes to pornography and hate speech and when some
criminal activities might be serious enough to be punished, in part, by
taking away the offender's voting franchise; they are felt when it comes to
drawing lines over what rule to have about abortion, or where to strike the
balance between road safety and allowing impaired driving suspects to
call a lawyer or between controlled, affordable immigration procedures
and allowing refugee claimants an oral hearing before a judge. It is down
here where bills of rights have to be given a context specific to the case in
hand, that judges make their decisions; decisions that amount to drawing
social policy lines.
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And notice yet again that down in this quagmire of detail, of giving
nrhts a context specific to the case in hand, there is always disagreement,
debate and dispute about how these rights should play out. All the consensus and near unanimity is found only up in the Olympian heights. Down
where unelected judges decide real life cases there are only differences of
moral opinion. And those who happen to disagree with one's own views
about ho\\ rights should rank against one another, who is to possess them,
and whether and when they should lose out to broader social interests
cannot easily be dismissed as unreasonable, morally blind, evil or in need
of re-education. It is simply a fact that how rights should play out is highly
debatable, and not self-evident.'
Put in place a bill of rights, then, and xou transfer at least some power
to unelected judges to make some of these social policy decisions, to draw
some of these contentious lines under the coxer provided by the amorphous, appealing language of rights. That is \%hat happens under a bill of
rights regime.
As an unashamed majoritarian I think the effect of adopting a bill of
rights is that too much power gets transferred to an unelected judiciary.
Nothing in the nature of rights themselves justifies this transfer. Whether
weak rights adherent or strong, one can be in favour of rights themselves
but not in favour of bills of rights. Be clear about this point. It is not only
those who (explicitly or implicitly, but usually implicitly) endorse undercutting citizens' participation in drawing fundamental lines about the reach,
force and weight of rights who \alue rights. The majoritarian who trusts
his fello\ citizens to drawN these lines values rights too.
What makes the transfer of power to judges under a bill of rights
appear attractive is the unspoken assumption that the lines drawn by judges
are always the right lines. The attractions and prestige of rights themselves
need to be transferred over to the judiciar and vhate\ er lines they happen
to be drawing in the name of those rights. When people think "'Only this
judge drawn line is the rights-respecting line," the\ w ill also think critics
of the judiciary are critics of rights.
Let me put that another way. It is easy to see the attractions of binding
future legislatures and generations to an entrenched and overriding list of
rights outcomes when the appropriateness of some list, over others, is
evident. Where the formulating of a list of rights outcomes - say, all the
outcomes decided by our judges under the Charterof Rights these past 23
years - is believed to be easy and obvious, then any quibbling by dissent-

I

W
Waldron, supra, note II.
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ers can be put down to bad faith or knavery or self-interest or not being in
favour of rights. The trouble is, of course, that the appropriateness of any
list of rights outcomes (as opposed. possibly, to a list of rights themselves " ,
vill never be evident or uncontentious or obviously fitting or clear to all
right-thinking, reasonable, nice human beings. When judges decide cases
about rights they are drawing lines that could have been drawn elsewhere,
and still in the name of rights themselves."4
In the Canadian context it needs to be said that the section 1 abridging
enquiry is no less a matter of drawing debatable lines than is any earlier
step of deciding on the scope and application of rights. Having to decide
when a law prescribes reasonable limits on a right is no less contentious,
no less lacking in self-evident rights answers, than the earlier step. The
"reasonable limit on rights" lines drawn by a committee of ex-lawyers are
not obviously morally superior to lines that x\ould be drawn by others, or
at least Nre would want to hear a fairly extensive argument as to why judges
ha\e superior moral perspicacity than the rest of us or .khy being a judge
makes it empirically more likel\ that a "'right line" (assuming one exists)
wvill be drawn.
We can no\\ move from the abstract to the concrete. We are now in a
position to consider whether there might be any special answer the nonmajoritarian can give the majoritarian in the Canadian context.

III.

fajoritarianismv. The Charter

Recall the essence of the majonitarian case. Bills of rights undercut citizens' participation in social decision-making. They transfer too much power
to unelected judges. From that premise the critique can and does branch
out in various ways. Some critics assert that (in consequentialist terms)
unelected judges do not, in fact, deliver noticeably better rights outcomes
- for those with minority viexN s. practices, characteristics, for the weak
- than the elected branches of go\ernment.
Others note the irony of rights adherents (most of whom are strong
rights believers) appealing to a hard line consequentialist justification
namely that judges deliver better outcomes than elected politicians.

18. And people even disagree here, about what is the most appropriate ltst of rights to set out in a
Bill of Rights.
19. This should be obvious from 5-4 decisions in top courts. Otherwise a change of votc by one
judge would change the right answer, the right place to draw the line, the rights-respecting outcome.
On this way of thinking some particular outcome would be right h uuoc five judges happened to
say so. instead of the other way around.
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Others warn of an excessively politicized judiciary, however much this
may be masked by having one political party in power for most of the past
40)vears and so ha\ Ing had them appoint almost all the topjudges in Canada."1
Others, again, point to the sort of"living tree", "contemporary values"
interpretive techniques which generally accompany bills of rights and which
impose few, if any, constraints on the outcomes judges can reach.
And others still observe that bills of rights establish a dispute resolution system that is ex cry bit as procedural as majoritarian democracy. In
the event of disagreement about where to drawN difficult lines about the
extent and weight of rights, the judges xote. Five \otes beat four. The
victory does not go to the judge writing the most moving judgment or the
one \x ith the most references to moral philosophy. Any or all of these
further supplements can be part of the majoritarian's anti-bill of rights
critique.
Does anything saxe the orthodox position in Canada today, the Charter status quo, from these critiques? Is it possible to respond that these
majoritarian concerns do not really apply to Charter adjudication? Kent
Roach thinks the ansxxer to both questions can be "yes."' Roach asserts
that sections 1 and 33 of the Charter make all the difference to rescuing us
from oxcr-powerful judges. I disagree, as wxill become plain.
Let us start with section 33, the override or notx ithstanding provision.
Roach concedes that the override is rarel\ used, though he does say that
'[r]eports of the death of the override max, ho\\exer, be exaggerated ...
[it] still prox ides the ultimate weapon should legislatures be unwilling to
accept court decisions."In fact, a more accurate statement of the oxerride - or rather its lack
of use - would note that in o\ er t enty years it has never been used, not
MIe single time, b\ the federal Parliament"' (and the 2)114 federal election

20, Note that '( anada differs from the United States and Australia in that the top judges in the
pro\ mces are chosen by the federal go\ernment. This gies a sense of homogeneity ofjudicial outlook not prcsent in the US or Australia. Imagine ifJohn Kerry had \\on the US presidencN and could
appoint the top judges in Tc\as. Then consider if Ralph Klein would appoint the same sort ofjudges
t,, the Alberta Court ol \ppeal as the federal Liberal Party has done. The point is that widespread
homogeneit. of judicial outlook and approach is not proof of an apolitical judiciary.
21. See Kent Roach. The Supreme Court on Trial.- Judicial 1, to im or Democratic Dialogue
(Toronto Irv in, 2001 ). \y critique here of Roach's position is taken from my "The Author Doth
P
0s Moo\uch,
Mc Thinks" (2003) 2(0 N.Z.I . Re\ 519.

22.

Roach. ihI/ at 78.

23.

And at the pro,,incial lcvcl, outside of Quebec which did not sign up to the 1982 repatriation of

the Constitutin x ith its Charter, s. 33 has been used not more than a handful of times, with some of
those uses being redundant, irrclevant or inconsequential. I do not know if, outside of Quebec, s. 33
ha,. ecr been used to overturn a court decision.
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campaign made it seem to this obser\ er that it is nearing the "never can be
used" precipice). N1oreoc Cr. an use of the pro\ ision \'ill only last for t'i\
c
\cars unless renewed for another term. It cannot be used to gainsay the
judges line drawing ,as regards all of the Charter .'rights, only some.24 In
short, at least to this observer, the section 33 o\ erride is as close to dead
and useless as \ou can get without believing in reincarnation.
That is not all. As both Jeffre\ Goldsworthv' and Grant Huscroft"
have already made clear, section 33's \ordinu authorizes Canadian
legislatures to declare that their enactments "shall operate not\\ithstanding a pro\ ision included in [specified sections] of this Charter." The wording implies, incorrectl\ and inaccuratel\, a power to o\erride the Charter
itself. What it should sa\ is that the elected legislature has a power to
override disputed and debatable judicial interpretations of the Charter.
Otherwise xou beg the question b cvouming that judges' \ ic\\ s are a
better indication of \\hat the Charter does or does not require than are the
vie\vs of elected legislators. But that assumption is the \ erv point in
dispute. So the wording of the Charter section 33 override makes a legislative response c\tremel\ difficult from the beginning by making it seem
as though legislators, \\hen in\ oking the override, are against the Charh'r
and against rights. \\hen a far more accurate characterisation would be
that they are simply taking a different x iexx of\\ fhat the amorphous 1 mplan rights guarantees require dowxn in the quagmire of detail.
And even that is not all there is to sa\ about the "rarelx used oxerride.""' One could exen argue that wxhat this oxcrride may do in practice,
paradoxically, is to free the judges up to be e\en more actix ist - even
more prepared to use their moral viexx s to second guess the legislature's
line drawing - than they would ha\ e been \\
ithout the "cox er" provided
by such an ox erride. American judges know the\ hax c the last xword and
that this cannot be disguised. In Canada, judges can point to section 33 to
escape this conclusion, and the\ can do so even while knowing that the

24

See textaccompan. ing note 31.
5cc e firc',\ ( Id" rth. Judicial Re\ ie\., LeLlatic Oerride. and Democracy" in Campbell,
Golds% srth. and Stone, eds.,
Pot
fting Human Rights In.Orneits and Instits (Oxford.OUP

25

2001 263 and "'Legislation, Interpretation and Judicial Re\ ic,%'"
(2001) 51 L T.L.J. 7".
ofRight,. and the Role of( ourts and Legislatures" in Huscroft
26 See Grant Hurofi, Right,. Bill,
and Rishv orth, ed, . Litigating Rights (O\ford: Hart Publishing. 20021 12 See also his chapter "A
Constitutional "\sork in Progres''? The Charter and theLimits of Progresi\e Interpretation" ii
Huscroft and Brodie. ed., Constitutionalism in the Charter Era I Markham, On.. Butters orths, 2004)
413.

27. Charter, supra note 1,s. 33.
28. Roach, supra note 21 at 7X
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practical chances of it being used are barely above zero.
In my opinion it is not far-fetchcd to think that this may make some
judges feel more free to indulge their own personal moral views about
where to draw debatable lines, to be less deferential to the elected legislature. Who knows for sure'? What we do know is that many of the people
who point to section 33 to justify a more self-assured, less deferential
judiciary would assuredly be adamantly opposed to any actual use of
section 33. They would be amongst the first ones to shout, falsely, that by
invoking section 33 the government, and public, was against rights, against
the Charter, and even against the Constitution.
If section 33 does little to help Roach fend off the majoritarian's
criticisms, what about the section 1 abridging enquiry provision? As I noted
above, deciding on what is or is not a reasonable limit to a right is no less
a matter of drawing debatable and contested lines than is the earlier step of
deciding how an amorphous right guarantee from up in the Olympian
heights is going to play out down in the quagmire of detail. And as regards
both steps, the status quo position under the Charter is that the judges
decide. In Canada we may have a two step process; American judges by
contrast, make their decision about what is reasonable and justifiable all in
the same single step of defining the scope of the right. But in Canada,
exery bit as much as in the US, it is the judges who are deciding what
restrictions are permissible, not the elected legislators or the electorate.
Roach says Canadian judges, under section 1, "must also listen to
government's justifications for limiting such rights. ,2' True, the judges
ha\ c to listen, but only in the sense that the elected branches get to plead
their case in court. No matter how you look at section 1 it is still, solely
and exclusively, the judges who get to decide what are reasonable and
justifiable limits.
What happens if the elected legislature, under section 1, responds to a
judicial striking down by passing something similar to the same statute
again'? Will this sort of "in-your-face repl[y]", 3" one that impliedly says
the legislature thinks the Court's moral view (its view of where to draw the
line) is wrong, make any difference?
Apparently not, at least if the recent saga in which the Canadian

29.
30.

Roach, supra note 21 at 234
Roach, supra note 21 at 277. Notice that Roach dislikes these sort of"in-your-face replies". He

says reliance on such statutes "is dangerous becausc it diminishes respect for the Court as an institution . . without the special safeguards and sober second thoughts of the override". (Roach, supra
note 21 at 276-277).
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federal Parliament tried to reinstate limits on the voting rights of some
convicted, incarcerated prisoners31is any indication:
Finally, the fact that the challenged denial of the right to vote followed
judicial rejection of an even more comprehensive denial, does not mean
that the Court should defer to Parliament as part of a "dialogue". Parliament
must ensure that whatexer law it passes, at whatever stage of the process,
conforms to the Constitution. The healthy and important promotion of a
dialogue between legislature and the courts should not be debased to a
rule of"if at first you don't succeed, try, try, again."' Unless one simply assumes that elected legislators cannot make
reasonable interpretations about rights, cannot draw reasonable lines down
in the quagmire of detail, it is hard to see how the section I abridging
enquiry provision helps ward off the majoritarian's criticisms.
Nox some people do assume this - do think that legislators are
morally deficient when compared to theirjudicial colleagues. Such people
rarely say this straight out. But when pushed it becomes clear that their
support for the status quo Canadian Charter position actually rests on a
belief that judges will give them more of what they want, as social
progressives, sax. or as prisoner advocates, or whatever. (Some of them
may combine this wxith a belief that there are knowNrable right moral
answers about where to draw the lines of social policy, 33 but this is not
necessary). Certainly it is easier to say you are "for rights" than to say you
are "for unelected judges". although in my view that is all adherents of the
Charter status quo can mean. Majoritarians are "for rights" too. They just
happen to think that the line drawing which is inevitably a part and parcel
of being "for rights" is better done by the elected branches.
Let us consider the not too implausible hypothetical of someone who
believes that there are right moral answers down in the process of line
drawing and that those right answers broadly align with whatever is the
most "progressive" or social democratic alternative. She would support

31. After the Supreme Court had earlier struck down a complete ban on prisoner voting. See Sauvc
t.Canada (Attorney General) [1993] 2 S.C.R. 438.
32. Sauv' v Canada (ChiefEditorial Officer), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519 at para. 17 (per the Chief Justice). Notice here again the conflation of "conforming to what we judges say the (ion, itution requires" and "conforming to the Constitution."
33. People who believe that there is some morally right answer to how a set of vague, amorphous
rights guarantees should play out down in the quagmire of detail almost always also believe, mirahile
dictu, that the.', and not their opponents, happen to have an almost God-like access to what those

answers are.
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the ChArtr status quo because she thinks judges better deliver the goods
in the Canadian context than does Parliament. On the other hand, were she
in the Us during President Clinton's tenure, she might opt instead for the
elected legislature.
The majoritarian rejects that sort of self-interested approach. Whate\cr line the unelected judges may draw, the majoritarian says it is better
for the elected legislators to draw it whether he agrees with the result or
not. 4 He is prepared to w in some, but also to lose some (or rather, he
,houdd he o pre7ared,though as a matter of fact there are obviously some
Alec Bald\ ins out there who threaten to move ax\ ax when votes do not go
their xxax ). e thinks that part of li\ ing in a healthy society is that when
contentious issues arise, including iSsUes surrounding rights, deciding by
voting,. b\ "letting the numbers count" is preferable to deciding by letting
an aristocratic judiciary decide (b\ themiselx es voting, though with a markedly more restricted franchise). He is unashamed to be a majoritarian. In
fact, this looks to him to be a more desirable, more potent moral stance
than that taken bx the anti-majoritarian \\ hose embrace of rights so often
carries with it a moral self-righteousness and disdain for (or condescension regarding) the capacities and abilities of her fellow citizens and their
elected representatixes, at least when it comes to rights. The majoritarian
values highly the right to participate, be it on a strong rights or wNeak rights
basis. He xalues it even when it comes to rights themselves and how they
should play out and be limited do\\n in the quagmire of detail. He is not
prepared to subordinate the x ie, s ofthe many, to the \ iewx s of a committee
of ex-lawvvers.
Accordingl. I say again as I said to begin this article, I am an
unashamed majoritarian, however unpopular that xiew may be in today's
Canada or in its law schools.

IV 4 Lament or Something 1loreY
The reader will bx now be wondering what the point of this article is.
Vhatever the attractions might be (or might not be) of Parliamentary
So%ereignty on the "ought" lexc l of what should be the case, we all know

14

For more on this see "'S mrithy"', supra note 9. espcially the "Concluding Remarks."
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that in Canada that option is gone forever. The Charter is here to stay."5 So
is this whole article just a pessimistic lament?
In part, yes. Having lived and worked overseas now for nearly two
decades I find it depressing, and embarrassing, to return to my native Canada
for haifa year to find so many citizens willing to throw their lot in with an
aristocratic judiciary, to let these committees of unelected ex-lawyers draw
so many of the lines surrounding rights. Likewise, or perhaps worse, I
frankly cannot imagine any political party (on the right or left) in New
Zealand or Australia or the United Kingdom ever making one of its main
election planks the promise that the elected representatives of the people
would never second guess the judges, i.e. that if returned to power they
would never invoke the section 33 notwithstanding clause. But this is more
or less the promise that \\as made by the Liberal Party before the 2004
federal election. 3(
Some, like Kent Roach, might put the blame for this state of affairs on
the elected politicians and the electorate, not on the judges: "[Insufficient
use of section 33] may be true. but if blame must be assigned, it should be
directed at ... governments and not the Charter ... -37' Roach continues:
"If section 33 is not used to correct judicial decisions that the public finds
fundamentally unacceptable. the fault seems to lie more in the public's
acceptance of the infallibility of judicial declarations of rights or the
government's lack of will than in the structure of the Charter or the Court."T3
The answer to unacceptable judicial activism under a modem bill of rights
is legislatixe activism and the assertion of democratic responsibility for
limiting or overriding the Court's decisions. 3'

35. The judges sometimes tell us the. did not ask for the Charter. But then neither did . There were
no referenda on whether to have it there were no elections, federal or pro\incial, on x hether to have
it, indeed the election that brought in a Prime Minister committed to bringing it in %as fought on the
price of gas. And any\%a., howe\ er democratic a process may be that opts to move to a new constitutional regime, it in no way follows that the newlx chosen regime is itself more democratic than the
old. People could vote in huge majoritie, to move to a political system where a massive amount of
line-drawing input is given to pnests or to military caudillos. But that would not make what they
chose somehow more democratic than the rawer majoritarianism that preceded it. One must distinguish end result procedures from the procedures used to move between end results. Jeremy Waldron
has made this point somewhere in his many wntings
36. Perhaps this sort of read', abdication to the judiciary of the power to draw highly contested
social policy lines goes some small way to explaining the appallingly low 61% voter turnout rate in
that 2004 election, or the much, much worse rate amongst young voters. Certainly Canadians are no
longer in a position to look on smugly at L:S voter turnout. The two countries' rates were sirtually
identical in the two respective 2004 elections.
37. Roach, supra note 21 at 60.
38. Roach, supra note 21 at 78.
39. Roach, supra note 21 at 296.
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In my opinion, this is too easy and unconvincing a reply (to say nothing of
the issue raised ahove of how many of those who give this reply actually in
their hearts hope for a "greater assertion of democratic responsibility").
Surely the judges also have some responsibility for the current state of
affairs.
I think they do." Judges too often talk as though the choice in supporting or rejecting the Charter status quo is one between having rights or not
hax ing rights. This assertion is palpably false, as I hope this article has
convinced the reader.
Not just that, judges here could adopt methods of interpretation that
build in a much greater degree of deference to the legislature, and that
emphasize the importance of that deference, through some sort of vigorous "margin of error" doctrine or through use (or greater use or more restrictivc operation) of such American doctrines as political questions, ripeness. mootness and standing.' They could even transplant some of their
willingness to look to original intentions in the sections 91 and 92 context
ox er into constitutionalized rights adjudication." The point is that the rights
in the Charter are not self-defining and that nothing in that instrument
forecloses more deference on these difficult line drawing exercises than is
currently show\n by Canada's top judges.
Even those xith a near absolutist commitment to equality might pause
for a moment and consider w\hich process more fully treats their fellow
citizens as equals - one in which \ erxone gets the same vote and thus
the same (however statiscally insignificant) say or one which is litigation
drixen and in which lawyers, legal academics, certain pressure groups and
most noteably a handful of unelected judges are gix en massively more say.
In terms of the "right to participate", the status quo Canadian Char-ter
position comes nowhere close to delivering equality. More to the point,
however flaNed our representative democratic institutions might be, the
current status quo comes nowhere close to delivering the same equality of
input as the pre-Charter position.
If a fe\\ judges (and even the odd legal academic) started speaking up
about how they do not have a pipeline to heax enly wisdom on all these
morally fraught issues, and about how those w\ho disagree with their

40
1-or a similar view see Grant Hiucrol's "Thank God \We're Here: Judicial Exclusi ity in Charter Interpretation and its Conscquences" (2004) 25 Sup. Ct. L. Re\ 241.
41
Scc [.aI. rcnce Tribe, Am eit
(
C',n
itu mal Lau , 3d ed.. (Ne\\ Yokrk: Foundation Press, 2000)
at I I-3,55.
42
See the chapter, ot'Justices Binnie and Scalia tn ( )m ttta
n i in the Charter Era, supra at
note 26
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decisions down in the quagmire of detail can still be strong supporters of
rights up in the Olympian heights, maybe we would see the emergence of
a bit of backbone in the electorate and traces of will in the elected politicians. Maybe then Kent Roach's seeming endorsement of a bit of"legislative activism and the assertion of democratic responsibility for limiting or
overriding the Court's decisions""3 might be something other than hollow.
I, for one, would welcome both.

43.

Roach, supra note 21 at 296.

